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Abstract
The media and policy makers often mention that China manipulates its real exchange rate (RER)
in order to improve its exports and boost growth. This view, however, is not supported by the most
prominent economic models, which do not predict a positive relationship between real undervalua-
tion and economic growth. I propose a 3-sector model with labor market frictions that explains how
a policy aimed at increasing domestic savings and depreciating the RER can, at the same time, gen-
erate real growth through a reallocation of workers from a low-productivity traditional sector into a
high-productivity manufacturing sector. The policy is particularly effective in countries with relative
abundance of labor, scarcity of agricultural resources, and high barriers for the entry of workers into
the manufacturing sector. Empirically, I verify that higher real undervaluation (measured as devia-
tions from PPP) is positively associated with GDP and manufacturing growth in countries with lower
per capita agricultural land and higher rural population. The relationship vanishes and even becomes
negative in the opposite cases. Finally, I propose a simple methodology for the identification of real
depreciations exogenously induced (i.e. that are not related to changes in productivities or in terms
of trade). I find that, during the last 20 years, such episodes have been mainly observed in East Asian
developing countries.
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Is it true that a competitive exchange rate is behind China’s success? Over the past two decades, China has
experienced one of the most remarkable economic transformations of modern economic history. Mil-
lions of workers have migrated from the traditional economy into rapidly expanding industrial areas,
manufacturing production and exports have dramatically increased, and per capita income has grown
at almost double-digit rates during the last 20 years. Such an outstanding performance is explained,
according to many media analysts and policy makers, by a direct manipulation of the exchange rate by
the Chinese government, aimed, they say, at keeping the real exchange rate (RER) undervalued and thus
fostering exports and growth1. This view, however, is not supported by the most prominent economic
models, which do not predict a positive relationship between an undervalued RER and growth. Accord-
ing to them, either changes in the nominal exchange rate should be accompanied by changes in prices
that would virtually leave the RER unchanged, or, if the pressure for appreciation is somehow "con-
trolled" through a containment of the domestic demand, the induced real depreciation would introduce
a distortion and lead to a misallocation of resources and an eventual fall in real output.
In this paper, I combine A. Lewis’ idea of unlimited supply of labor (Lewis (1954)) with Corden and
Neary’s notion of Dutch disease (Corden & Neary (1982)) to explain how a policy aimed at depreciating
the RER can generate real growth and facilitate the transition from a traditional to a modern economy
in countries with relative abundance of labor and scarcity of natural resources. The model’s predictions
are consistent not only with the main features of the Chinese experience but also with those of most
Asian "miracles" and other developing countries in Latin America and South Saharan Africa. The key
elements in the proposed mechanism are frictions in the labor market and reallocation of labor across
sectors. In the model, high rates of growth are sustained by reallocating labor from a low-productivity
traditional sector (agriculture and nontradables) to a high-productivity manufacturing one. With dimin-
ishing returns in agriculture, a policy aimed at lowering wages induces migration to manufacturing by
increasing the wage differential across sectors, thereby generating a real depreciation and growth, and
moving the economy to a new steady state with higher per capita income. Interestingly, the effect of
such a policy is potentially stronger in economies with relatively low endowments of natural resources,
which is precisely the case of most Asian countries.
This paper is related to at least three bodies of literature. First, it is part of the new literature on the ef-
fect of a persistent real exchange rate depreciation on growth. Most of this literature is empirical and has
been devoted to document the relationship between RER and growth and other macroeconomic vari-
1See, for example, Wiemer (2009), Davis (2012), Lee (2012).
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ables (see, for example, Razin & Collins (1997), Hausmann et al. (2005), Prasad et al. (2006), Eichengreen
(2007), Rodrik (2008), Berg & Miao (2010), Jeong et al. (2010), Aflouk & Mazier (2011), and Rapetti et al.
(2012) among others). As Montiel & Servén (2008) mention, there are basically two proposed theoretical
channels to explain a possible positive relationship between RER depreciation and growth: the "TFP"
channel, which assumes that increasing the production of tradables has a positive effect on TFP growth;
and the "capital accumulation" channel, which relies on a link between real depreciation, domestic sav-
ings, and capital accumulation (see Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger (2007) and Montiel & Servén (2008)).
Despite the fact that the mechanism proposed in this paper shares some elements with the "capital ac-
cumulation" view, it is nonetheless a radically different channel, whose key element is the intersectoral
reallocation of labor motivated by the depreciation. This key feature of the mechanism makes the paper,
at the same time, part of a recent literature focused on micro-level resource misallocation to explain low
levels of aggregate TFP. In one of the most recent and influential papers in this field, Song et al. (2011)
explain the high rates of growth and savings of China with a mechanism that emphasizes the role of
financial frictions and reallocation of resources between firms in the manufacturing sector. In contrast,
this work focuses on labor frictions and intersectoral reallocations which, besides explaining the high
rates of growth and savings recently observed in many Asian economies, provide also a rationale for the
undervalued currencies, the high rates of urbanization, and the decline in the size of traditional sectors
experienced by them. The paper is related in this field with, for example, the work of Banerjee & New-
man (1998) and Banerjee & Duflo (2007), and with the recent empirical evidence on productivity and
income gaps presented in Bosworth & Collins (2008), McMillan & Rodrik (2011), Gollin et al. (2011), and
de Vries et al. (2012)2. Finally, this paper is related to the literature on structural transformation. Specifi-
cally, the model explains how the speed of the transition from an agricultural/traditional to an industrial
economy can be affected by interventions aimed at lowering real wages, particularly in countries with
scarce natural resources.
In the proposed model, workers that migrate from the traditional economy to the manufacturing
sector face a loss of utility (i.e. an entry cost), which reduces the minimum wage that they are willing
to accept in the traditional economy before migrating, and can potentially create a wedge between the
wages (and productivities) in both sectors. In this context, a policy that lowers the real wage in the
traditional sector can eventually trigger (or accelerate) the migration of workers to manufacturing, and
generate growth through a better allocation of labor. Once the intervention (aimed at depreciating the
2In a broader sense, the paper is also part of an extensive literature on the causes and consequences of rural-urban labor
migration that follows, among others, the work of Harris & Todaro (1970).
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RER) ceases, the economy behaves as in a standard neoclassical model where growth depends on TFP
growth. These predictions are consistent with the experience of most East Asian countries (and with the
recent experience of China, in particular), that have sustained high rates of growth for long periods of
time by mobilizing employment from an initially overpopulated traditional economy to the industrial
sector3, a fact that was already documented by Alwyn Young in his celebrated paper The Tyranny of
Numbers (Young (1995)) in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
A particular feature of the theory proposed in this paper is that the potential effects of a government-
induced real undervaluation depend on the size and productivity of the agricultural sector. Specifically,
a more productive agricultural sector and a higher endowment of agricultural land imply either a higher
wage in the sector or higher land’s rents (or both), which tends to increase the difference between the
actual and the minimum wage workers in the traditional economy are willing to accept before migrating.
In this context, inducing migration to manufacturing requires a larger real depreciation (i.e. a larger fall
in wage) and, given the higher initial productivity in agriculture, has a smaller final effect on growth.
This prediction of the model is consistent with the fact that, as shown in Section 1 of the paper, the
use of (policy-induced) undervalued RER’s seem to be more extended and effective in Asian countries,
where the relative endowment of land suitable for agriculture is lower (see Table II). These empirical
regularities predicted by the model are also consistent with the empirical analysis performed in Section
3, which shows that the East Asian countries have been more prone to experience policy-induced real
undervaluations in the last two decades. Finally, and also in line with the predictions of the model, the
empirical analysis verifies that the positive relationship between real undervaluation and both, growth
of per capita GDP and manufacturing production, is stronger in countries with lower endowments of
agricultural resources, higher ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and higher initial rural population.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the empirical evidence from Asia, Latin Amer-
ica and S.S. Africa that motivates the main assumptions of the model. Section 2 introduces the model,
characterizes the equilibrium, and analyzes possible government interventions aimed at depreciating the
RER and their potential effects on growth. Section 3 verifies additional empirical regularities predicted
by the model using a panel of countries between 1970 and 2010. Section 4 concludes.
3The mobilization of labor has been accompanied by the corresponding expansion of the stock of capital in that sector.
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1 Empirical Regularities
In this Section I present some empirical evidence on the relationships between real undervaluation,
growth, manufacturing production and employment, and gross savings, across different countries and
regions. I provide the intuition of the mechanism that explains the links between these variables and
identify the conditions that make them potentially stronger. I finish the Section providing empirical
evidence that such conditions are mainly observed in Asia, and in China in particular.
1.1 Real Exchange Rate Undervaluation and Growth
In an influential (and no less controversial) paper, Rodrik (2008) argues that undervaluation of the cur-
rency (i.e. a real exchange rate depreciation) stimulates economic growth, and that the effect is par-
ticularly strong in developing countries. Using a Balassa-Samuelson-adjusted PPP method to measure
undervaluation, Rodrik presents evidence suggesting that the link between RER undervaluation and
growth is through the expansion of the industrial sector. In an extension of Rodrik’s work, Berg & Miao
(2010) find similar results. Among other papers that, using different measures of RER misalignment,
document similar regularities are Aguirre & Calderón (2005), Polterovich & Popov (2005), Sallenave
(2010), Aflouk & Mazier (2011), and Béreau et al. (2012)4. In addition, many of these works and others
like Sachs & Williamson (1985), Edwards (1988), Ghura & Grennes (1993), Loayza et al. (2004), and Rajan
& Subramanian (2011) find evidence of the negative effects of RER overvaluation on growth.
[Figure I here]
The recent experience of China provides a good example of the positive relationship between under-
valuation and growth. Figure I presents data on per capita GDP growth (PPP) and an index of RER
undervaluation5 for China, India, and two groups with the main non oil-exporting economies of Latin
America and South Saharan Africa, respectively. Based on the figures, three main observations can be
made regarding the relationship between undervaluation and GDP growth. First, the relationship is not
necessarily positive in the short run, particularly for the Latin American countries where the frequent
recessions are usually accompanied by real depreciations6. Second, the relationship holds in the long
4See Eichengreen (2007) and Aflouk & Mazier (2011) for an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on
real exchange rate missalignment and growth.
5The same measure used in Rodrik (2008). All the details regarding the estimation of this measure are discussed in Section
3.
6In Latin America, the hyperinflations of the early 1990’s, the Mexican crises of 1995, the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, and
the Argentine crisis of 2002 are all associated with both, recessions and large real depreciations.
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run, but is not monotonic: the Asian countries were on average both, the most undervalued (China
27% and India 52%) and the ones that experienced the highest growth (8.5% and 3.0% respectively), in
comparison to the Latin American and African countries that were relatively overvalued7 during the pe-
riod (with an index of undervaluation of -5% and -11% respectively) and experienced the lowest growth
(1.9% and 0.7% respectively). And, third, the relationship is not equally strong and in the same direction
in all countries: it seems to be positive in India, the African countries, and China in particular, while in
Latin America the relation is either null or negative.
Similar conclusions can be verified when considering a larger sample of countries and a longer pe-
riod. Table I presents several economic indicators for developing countries8 of Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, and South Saharan Africa. Columns (2) and (3) show that, besides China and India, other
Asian economies also maintained relatively high levels of undervaluation (21% in average) and experi-
enced high rates of growth (3.2% annual per capita in average over the entire period). The most relevant
examples in this group are South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and,
more recently, Vietnam and the Philippines. Their performance is in sharp contrast with that of the
African economies, which maintained high levels of overvaluation (-22% of undervaluation) and expe-
rienced very low rates of growth (0.5%). Finally, the link between real undervaluation and growth is,
again, weaker in the Latin American countries, which experienced very modest growth (1.6% annual)
and remained relatively undervalued during most of the period (11% in average).
[Table I here]
1.2 Savings
Column (5) of Table I presents information about savings in these economies. The most striking case
is China that, besides maintaining an extraordinary high average saving rate of 38.6% of GDP for more
than 40 years, has systematically increased the rate surpassing 50% of its GDP in the late 2000’s. This
increase of the saving rate (and particularly the accumulation of foreign assets during the last decade)
combined with an acceleration of GDP growth in China is consistent with the evidence presented in Song
et al. (2011). But Column (5) shows that savings have also increased in other Asian countries. In fact,
with the exception of Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines, the saving rate in all these economies
has increased and remained high (above 30% of GDP) during the last 20 years. As Prasad (2011) doc-
7Overvaluation is simply understood as negative undervaluation.
8Countries with per capita GDP (PPP 2005 USD) lower than 10,000 in 1970. The only countries in these regions that were
excluded are Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago.
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uments, a common feature across Asian countries during the last decade is the increase in corporate
savings, a phenomenon that seems to accompany the high rates of growth and relative undervaluation
of the economies of the region. These facts are consistent with the findings of Montiel & Servén (2008),
who document a negative relationship between savings and real exchange rate for the fast-growing East
Asian economies. These authors point out that, since both the real exchange rate and savings are en-
dogenous variables, we should not, a priori, expect a systematic correlation between them, except for the
countries that adopt the real exchange rate as a tool of development policy, which seems to be the case of
many Asian economies9. The case of S.S. Africa is, again, on the other extreme. Gross savings, that were
already low in the early 1970s, further declined over in the following decades to reach an average of
10.5% of GDP in the late 2000’s. The real exchange rate, at the same time, remained very overvalued dur-
ing the entire period, which seems to be related with the large aid inflows experienced by the region10,
as evidenced by Rajan & Subramanian (2011).
The Latin American countries maintained a relatively stable but low saving rate through the period11.
The region registered its lowest saving rate (17.9% of GDP in average) between 1991 and 2003, a period
of large capital inflows, relatively high overvaluation, and high but volatile growth.
1.3 The Manufacturing Sector
Columns (5) and (6) of Table I provide information about the size of the manufacturing sector relative to,
both, GDP and to total production of tradable goods12. Between 1970 and 2010, manufacturing produc-
tion in Asia grew faster than total GDP and, in particular, considerably more than the production of other
tradable goods (namely, agriculture, mining and forestry). This is is consistent with the evidence pre-
sented by Rodrik (2008), who argues that, in low income countries, the positive effect of undervaluation
on growth takes place through an expansion of the industrial sector. In sharp contrast, the manufactur-
ing sector in S.S. Africa (that was already small in 1970/74, accounting for 11.3% of GDP) shrank during
the same period , and the production of tradable goods further concentrated on commodities based on
natural resources. This is consistent with the literature that highlights the potential adverse effects of
9Montiel & Servén (2008), p.10.
10In average, between 1985 and 2010 the amount of Net Official Development Assistance received by the region accounted
for more than 5% of GNI (source: WDI).
11See Edwards (1996).
12Total production of tradable goods is estimated as the sum of industrial production (which includes manufacturing and
mining) and agricultural production. Specifically, it corresponds to categories A through E of ISIC Rev.3. This measure is a
good approximation of total tradable production, but is not exact since it includes electricity, gas and water supply (category
F), most of which is non tradable, and does not consider production of exportable services, whose relative importance remains
low but has increased in the last years.
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overvaluation on the manufacturing sector. These facts are also in line with the evidence presented by
Rajan & Subramanian (2011), who suggest that the poor performance of the manufacturing sector Africa
is related to the appreciation of the RER caused by aid inflows. Finally, the manufacturing sector in Latin
America also shrank (relative to GDP) during the period, and slightly reduced its share in the production
of tradable goods.
[Figure II here]
Figure II presents data on the share of employment in manufacturing and, again, the index of under-
valuation between 1990 and 2005 (2007 for China)13. From simple inspection it can be seen that, besides
the differences in levels of each of the variables across countries and regions, employment in manufac-
turing and the index of real undervaluation follow similar patterns in all of them. The only exception is
Latin America in the years between 2000 and 2005, where employment in manufacturing continues its
declining trend despite the fact that the RER began to depreciate.
1.4 Some Questions
It follows from the analysis of Tables I and I and Figures II and I that the relationships between real
undervaluation, manufacturing production and employment, and GDP growth appear to be stronger
in China, particularly after the reforms of 1992 and the devaluation of 1994, where the three indica-
tors first move downward in the aftermath of the Asian crisis (with a slowdown of GDP growth, a fall
in manufacturing employment and an real appreciation of the Renminbi), and then move up together
uninterruptedly from 2001 to 2007. In India and S.S. Africa, undervaluation and manufacturing employ-
ment follow relatively similar trends, but, in both cases, real GDP is less sensitive to changes in both
variables than it is in China. Finally, as it was already mentioned, the link between real undervaluation
and manufacturing production and employment and with GDP growth appears to be much weaker in
Latin America.
At least four important questions arise from the previous analysis. First, what is the mechanism, if
any, that links real undervaluation with production and employment in the manufacturing sector? Sec-
ond, how do changes in manufactures translate into higher rates of GDP growth? Third, why do these
links seem to be particularly strong in China and other Asian countries, but weaker in S.S. Africa and
practically nonexistent in Latin America? And, finally, what is the role that savings play in instrumenting
13Unfortunately there is no data on sectoral employment before 1990 for China and several other countries. The data used
here is mainly from Timmer & de Vries (2009) and McMillan & Rodrik (2011).
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a policy that effectively undervalue the RER, and (eventually) triggers an expansion of the manufactur-
ing sector and boosts growth? I sketch some answers to the first three questions before jumping into the
model where all of them are addressed in depth.
Undervaluation and the Value of Manufacturing Production (% GDP). If the law of one price holds
for tradable goods (or if at least it holds relatively more for tradables than for nontradables), then changes
in the real exchange rate should be mainly associated with changes in the relative price of nontradables.
How can a fall in the relative price of nontradables (i.e. a real undervaluation) be associated with an
increase in the share of manufacturing production in GDP? In an economy that is a net exporter of
manufactures (which is the case of most Asian countries), the link between a real undervaluation that
endogenously responds to changes in fundamentals (e.g. a fall in terms of trades of in the productivity of
the manufacturing sector), and the value of manufacturing production relative to GDP is expected to be
negative: the fall in the terms of trade or in the productivity of the exportable sector, which reduces the
value of manufacturing production (and of exports) relative to GDP, inducing a contraction in aggregate
demand and a (relative) fall in the price of nontradables. In order to obtain a positive relationship
between real undervaluation and manufacturing production14, it is necessary that the fall in the price
of nontradables responds to an "exogenous" contraction of aggregate demand (that is, one that is not
endogenously caused by a fall in terms of trade or in the productivity in the exportable sector), which
impacts negatively on the price (and, probably, the quantity produced) of nontradables, but does not
affect the value of the production of tradables (among them, the manufactures), whose productivities
and prices remain unchanged15.
Undervaluation and Employment in Manufacturing. Everything else constant, a real depreciation im-
plies that the relative price of tradables (not only manufactures, but also commodities and, in particular,
agricultural) increases, so that the demand for labor and capital in those sectors also increase. Employ-
ment in manufacturing increases if the real wage in that sector increases relatively more than the real
wage other tradable sectors, which is expected to happen if, as usual, labor productivity in agriculture
14The other possible explanation for the positive link between undervaluation and the share of manufacturing production
in GDP requires the economy to be a net importer of manufactures (and therefore a net exporter of commodities or services),
which is not the case of the Asian countries. In this case, the real depreciation could be induced by either a fall in the terms of
trade or in the productivity of the exportable sector, which affects reduces the value of the exportable production and, with it,
aggregate demand and the demand for nontradables. Since neither the productivity nor the price of manufactures change, the
shares of manufacturing production in both, GDP and total tradable production, increase. This case, however, does not seem to
correspond with the conditions of the Asian countries, which are net exporters of manufactures an importers of commodities.
15I use this outcome in Section 3 to identify the “exogenous” undervaluations (that is, those that are not related to changes in
fundamentals).
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(and in the production of other commodities) diminishes with the addition of workers due to the fact
that the stock of land is fixed.
Employment in Manufacturing and GDP Growth. The link between growth in employment in man-
ufacturing and real GDP growth is not trivial. Indeed, in a frictionless economy, the reallocation of labor
toward manufactures induced by an "exogenous" real undervaluation would actually cause a loss of ef-
ficiency and hurt GDP growth. This is the reason why some authors appeal to the existence of (indirect)
positive TFP effects associated with the expansion of the manufacturing sector (or, more generally, the
exportable sector) in order to explain the positive link between real undervaluation, manufacturing pro-
duction, and growth16. I take a different stand here. My hypothesis is that the positive effect on growth
from the reallocation of labor to the manufacturing sector is actually direct, and would come from the fact
that labor productivity in the manufacturing sector is higher than in the nontradable and the agricultural
sector (which constitute the "traditional" sectors of these economies). In this case, the real depreciation
would induce migration of (low-cost) workers from an initially low-productivity traditional economy
to a high-productivity manufacturing sector, implying an improvement in the allocation of labor. This
is precisely the environment described by Lewis (1954), in which an unlimited (large) supply of labor is
available at zero (very low) cost. Clearly, the larger the productivity gap between sectors, the larger the
effects on growth from the reallocation of workers.
The question now is where that initial labor productivity gap (between manufacturing and the tra-
ditional sectors) comes from. One possibility (that is explored in detail below) is the existence of entry
costs for workers that want to enter the manufacturing sector.
Why in Asia? With some light about the elements that link an induced undervaluation with employ-
ment in manufacturing, and this with real growth, we can outline an answer to the question about the
reasons why this mechanism seems to work in China and other Asian economies, but not so much in
South Saharan Africa and Latin America. My hypothesis is that, as shown in the next section, the con-
ditions described above (high entry costs for workers in manufacturing, high productivity gap between
sectors, and large shares of employment in the low-productivity sector) are more likely to hold in Asia,
and in particular in China, than in S.S. Africa or Latin America.
16See, for example, Eichengreen (2007).
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1.5 Labor Productivity in Manufactures and Agriculture
[Figure III here]
Figure III presents the ratio of average labor productivities in manufacturing and agriculture, be-
tween 1990 and 2005, for China, India, and the main non oil-exporting economies of Latin America and
S.S. Africa17. The figure confirms, first, that there exist opportunities for growth in all these regions by
reallocating workers to the manufacturing sector, and, second, that such growth opportunities are par-
ticularly relevant in China where, in 2003, the average worker in manufacturing was almost 10 times
more productive than the average worker in agriculture. The persistence (and even widening) of the
productivity gaps is evidence of the existence of labor market frictions or entry costs in the manufac-
turing sector. The productivity gap has increased in China (since the reforms in the early 1990s), and in
India (since 2001). On the other hand, the gap has declined in S.S. Africa (during the entire period), and
in Latin America (since the middle 1990s).
The regularities presented in Figure III are consistent with the evidence presented in an IMF Report
of 2006 (Jaumotte & Spatafora (2006)) that highlights that despite the fact that the agricultural sector
throughout developing Asia (and China, in particular) is characterized by a relatively low level of labor
productivity, it accounts for a very large share of employment. In this line, Bosworth & Collins (2008)
estimate that the productivity gap (i.e. ratio) between workers in the industrial sector and those in agri-
culture was in 2004 of 7 in China, and 4 in India. McMillan & Rodrik (2011) document that the average
manufactures-agriculture productivity gap is 2.3 in S.S. Africa, 2.8 in Latin America, and 3.9 in Asia, and
emphasize the role of labor reallocation as a contributor of growth in Asia. Using a more disaggregated
database, de Vries et al. (2012) confirm these results. In a recent work, Gollin et al. (2011) use micro data
from households surveys to document that the gap between agriculture and the rest of the economy
persists across regions even after controlling by hours worked and level of human capital. Using their
data, we can verify, again, that while the productivity gap in China is higher than in most developing
countries, in Latin America it is particularly low. What lies behind the differences in productivity gaps
across countries and regions? Figure IV shows the average labor productivity in manufacturing and
agriculture, both expressed in constant PPP USD of 2000. The graphs show that, despite the extraordi-
nary growth in manufacturing productivity in China after the reforms in the early 1990s, average labor
17Labor productivity is estimated as the ratio between value added and employment in each sector.
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productivity in that sector is still lower, in 2005, than in Latin America (which is, at the same time, low
relative to the industrialized countries). It follows, then, that the key behind the extraordinary high
productivity gap in China is not a particularly high level of productivity in manufacturing but, instead,
a strikingly low productivity in the agricultural sector. Indeed, except for 2005, China had the lowest
labor productivity in agriculture during the entire period (the same applies for India, whose agricultural
productivity in 2005 remained close to China’s, well below the level of S.S. Africa and Latin America).
Analogously, the reason behind the relatively low productivity gap in Latin America has mainly to do
with the high (and increasing) labor productivity in agriculture in the region.
[Figure IV here]
1.6 The Role of Natural Resources
A question that follows from the previous analysis is why is agricultural productivity so different in Asia
and Latin America. Part of the answer is given in column 3 of Table II , which displays the endowment
of agricultural (arable and cultivable) land per inhabitant of the different regions in 1990. The Asian
countries have the lowest endowment of agricultural land relative to the size of their population and,
among them, China ranks worst. Latin America and Africa, on the other hand, have the highest ratios,
with per capita endowments 3 times larger that of China. The numbers become even more contrasting
when we consider the share of rural population in each of the regions (column 5). More than 70% of
the population in the Asian and African countries lived in rural areas by 1990, compared with 29% in
Latin America. Indeed, the endowment of agricultural land per rural inhabitant in 1990 was about 7.5
times higher in Latin America than in Asia, a number that is in line with the relative labor productivity
in agriculture in both regions in the same year.
It is not only the availability of agricultural land (relative to the size of the population) that is higher in
Latin America. The pattern persists when considering mineral resources. Column 3 of Table II presents
per capita oil reserves for the different regions in 2002 (before the most recent discoveries of oil in Latin
America). Again, the East and South Asian countries rank worst. Per capita oil reserves in the Latin
American countries were, in average, 9 times higher than in China in that year18. The pattern is con-
firmed when comparing the amount of rents from natural resources, which are displayed in columns 1
and 2 of the table. Between 1990 and 2010, per capita rents from natural resources were about 6 times
18The number is still above 3 if Venezuela is excluded. Recent discoveries of oil in the region, elevated the ratio of per capita
oil in Latin America to China to more than 50 in 2011, and more than 8 if excluding Venezuela.
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higher in Latin America than in China, and almost 14 times higher than in India.
[Table II here]
The evidence suggests that differences in endowments of natural resources lay behind the observed
disparity of sectoral productivity gaps. The simultaneous observation of such gaps in productivities,
on the one hand, and of high shares of rural population, on the other, strongly suggest the existence of
frictions in the labor market that prevent an efficient allocation of labor. This situation is evident in the
Asian countries, and in China in particular, where the differences in sectoral productivities as well as the
fraction of population in the low-productivity sectors are larger19. It is precisely in such countries where
policy-induced real depreciations seem to play an important role facilitating the mobility of workers,
the expansion of the manufacturing sector, and, eventually, economic growth. In the following section
I develop a model that incorporates and these elements and provides an explanation for the observed
empirical regularities.
2 Model
Consider a static, small open economy with three sectors: agriculture, nontradables, and manufactures
(with prices pA, pN , and pM respectively). Agricultural goods and manufactures are tradable, and their
prices are given internationally. The economy is populated by a continuous mass (L = 1) of individ-
uals that supply inelastically 1 unit of labor and consume a basket (based on utility maximization) of
agricultural, nontradable, and manufacturing goods whose price is p = p˜ (pA, pN , pM ).
There is one competitive firm in each sector. Agricultural goods are produced combining labor (LA)
and land (F ). The supply of land, F , is exogenously given, so that the production function of agricul-
tural goods, YA = AAG(F,LA), exhibits diminishing returns in labor. The production of nontradables
and manufactures requires only labor, and their production functions, YN = ANLN and YM = AMLM
respectively, exhibit constant returns20.
19Kuijs & Wang (2006) document the existence of barriers to labor mobility in China, and argue that its reduction would
result in a substantial reduction in the income gap between rural and urban workers.
20For simplicity and in order to highlight the key role of the labor market, the model only considers labor as a production
factor (other than land). Capital can be included as an additional factor in the three sectors WLOG. If, for example, capital
consists of manufactures and is mobile across sectors (this would be the case in which capital is mainly composed of machinery
and equipment) the ratio K/L in the manufacturing sector will be determined by pM . On the other hand, if capital consists of
a mix of tradable and nontradable goods (this would be the case in which capital combines equipment and infrastructure), a
policy that depresses the nontradable sector and generates migration to manufacturing, will probably be accompanied by an
increase in investment that will affect the demand for nontradables, partially offsetting the initial effect.
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For simplicity, assume that land rents are distributed uniformly across individuals, so that each indi-
vidual receives an amount t ≡ rLF , where rL the rental price of land21.
2.1 Labor Market
The key assumption in the model is the existence of an entry cost for workers that enter the manufacturing
sector. Specifically, individuals that migrate from either nontradables or agriculture to the manufactur-
ing sector face a loss of utility EM ≥ 022. There is no cost for workers that enter either agriculture or
nontradables, which ensures that the wage is equalized between the two sectors. I refer to the combi-
nation of the agricultural and nontradable sectors as the traditional economy (or T -sector), whose wage
is wT and total employment LT = LA + LN . I use the subindex M to refer to the manufacturing sector
(M -sector), whose wage is wM and total employment LM .
The first order condition of the problem of the firm in the manufacturing sector implies that wM is
completely determined by the international price, pM , and the productivity of the firm, AM , and is equal
to wM = pMAM . Also, from the first order condition of the firm that produces nontradables, the price
in the sector is pN = wTAN . Therefore, given the prices pA and pM and the technology AN , the price of the
consumption basket, p, can be expressed as a function only of wT :
p = p˜ (pA, pN , pM )
= p˜
(
pA,
wT
AN
, pM
)
= p(wT )
2.2 Problem of the Individuals
The problem of an individual that is initially in sector S ∈ {T,M} consists in choosing the sector S′ ∈
{T,M} and the basket of goods {cA, cM , cN} that maximize his utility (net of migration costs) subject to
its budget constraint. The problem can be formalized as:
21This assumption is modified later, when the effects of different distributions of rents are analyzed.
22This loss of utility could be associated, for example, with the cost of search, acquisition of new specific skills, moving, the
distance to relatives and friends, or the cost of adaptation to an environment with different culture and lifestyle.
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V (S) = max
{cA,cM ,cN ,S′}
{
U(c (cA, cN , cM ))− I(S′ =M |S = T )EM
}
s.t. pAcA + pNcN + pMcM ≤ wS′ + t
where S ∈ {T,M} is the sector where the individual is initially located, S′ ∈ {T,M} is the sector where
the individual works (and whose wage is wS′), c (cA, cN , cM ) is the consumption aggregator, t is the rent
from land received by the individual, and I(S′ = M |S = L) is an indicator that takes value 1 if the
individual is initially in sector T and decides to migrate to sector M , and 0 in all other cases.
The problem can be solved in two stages. The first stage consists in solving for {cA, cM , cN} that max-
imize c (cA, cN , cM ) for a given incomewS+t and prices {pA, pN , pM}. The price index p = p (pA, pN , pM )
that results from this maximization allows to express the optimal final consumption as cS = wS+tp ,
S = T,M . The second stage consists in choosing the sector S′ ∈ {T,M} that maximizes utility net
of migration costs.
An individual in the T -sector. The decision of an individual that is initially in the T -sector can be
formalized as:
V (T ) = max {U(cT ), U(cM )− EM}
where U(cT ) is the value of staying in the T -sector, and U(cT )−EM is the value of migrating to manufac-
turing.
Two important observations can be made here. First, assuming that lim
LA→0
GL(F,LA) = ∞ (i.e. the
marginal product of labor in agriculture approaches infinity asLA approaches zero) and that lim
cN→0
∂U(c)
∂cN
=
∞ (i.e., the marginal utility of nontradable goods increases to infinity as cN approaches zero) ensures that
agricultural and nontradable goods will always be produced. Therefore, the value of migrating to manu-
facturing, U(cM )−EM , will be, in equilibrium, no greater than the value of staying in the T -sector, U(cT )
(otherwise, there would be complete migration to manufactures and no production of agricultural and
nontradable goods). And, second, if reaching the equilibrium implies migration to manufactures (in the
sense that the equilibrium’s labor share in manufacturing is strictly higher than the initial one), then,
once the equilibrium is reached, the value of staying in the T -sector is equalized to the value of mi-
grating. In this case, U(cT ) = U(cM ) − EM =⇒ U(cT ) < U(cM ) =⇒ cT < cM ⇐⇒ wT < wM .
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That is, the existence of a positive entry cost EM > 0, implies that the wage in the traditional sector is
strictly lower than the wage in manufacturing when there is migration. In fact, the "migration condition"
U(cT ) = U(cM ) − EM implicitly defines the minimum observable wage in the T -sector, wT , which satisfy:
U
(
wT+t
p(wT )
)
= U
(
wM+t
p(wT )
)
− EM .
An individual in the M -sector. The decision of an individual that is initially in the M -sector can be
formalized as:
V (M) = max {U(cM ), U(cT )}
where U(cM ) is the value of staying in manufacturing, and U(cT ) is the value of migrating to the T -sector.
In this case, since there is no cost associated with entering the T -sector, migration to the traditional sector
implies that U(cM ) ≤ U(cT ) ⇐⇒ wM ≤ wT . Eventually, if the equilibrium is such that wM < wT , there
is complete migration to the traditional sector and no production of manufactures.
2.3 Equilibrium
An important feature of the model is that, given set of parameters {AA, AN , AM , pA, pM , F, EM}, the
equilibrium depends on the initial distribution of employment. Specifically, defining LM0 ∈ [0, 1] as the
initial share of labor in the manufacturing sector, there exist a minimum LM and a maximum LM , with
0 ≤ LM ≤ LM 23, such that, in equilibrium, LM and wT are:
Equilibrium LM and wT : Initial Empl. in Manuf. Case
LM = LM and wT = wT if LM0 ≤ LM [1]
LM = LM0 and wT < wT < wM if LM < LM0 < LM [2]
LM = LM and wM ≤ wT if LM ≤ LM0 [3]
(in this case, wM < wT ⇐⇒ LM = 0)
In other words, for a given set of parameters, the equilibrium level of employment in manufacturing,
LM , and wage in the traditional sector, wT , are in the ranges [LM , LM ] and [wT , wM ] respectively (unless
LM = 0 and wT > wM , which is an extreme case with no production of manufactures), but the actual
levels within those ranges depend exclusively on the initial employment distribution (LM0 and LT0 =
23The minimum is LM = 1 − LA + LN , where LA is such that wT = pAGL(F,LA) and LN is such that the market of
nontradables clears. The maximum is either LM = 1 − LA + LN , where LA is such that wM = pAGL(F,LA) and LN is such
that the market of nontradables clears, or LM = 0 if the market of nontradables does not clear with wT = wM .
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1 − LM0). Interestingly, there is reallocation of labor between from the traditional to the manufacturing
sector only if wT = wT (the minimum observable), and from manufactures to the traditional sector
if wT = wM (the maximum). On the other hand, employment in manufactures does not change if
wT < wT < wM , which is the case when LM < LM0 < LM . The three cases are summarized in Figure V
and are described below.
[Figure V here]
2.3.1 Case 1: Expansion of the Manufacturing Sector
In case 1, employment in the T -sector, LT0, is greater than the equilibrium level LT , so that the value of
staying in the sector is strictly lower than the value of migrating. Migration to manufacturing takes place
until the "migration" condition (1) holds. Once wT = wT , employment in agriculture LA is determined
by the first order condition of the firm in that sector. Employment in manufacturing LM and nontrad-
ables LN are simultaneously determined by imposing trade balance (or, equivalently, equilibrium in the
nontradable market).
U
(
wM + t
p(wT )
)
− U
(
wT + t
p(wT )
)
= EM (1)
Equation (1) shows how the fact that the entry cost in manufacturing is expressed in terms of utility
implies that differences inEM do not translate into proportional differences in wages across sectors. Two
elements are key here: the concavity of the utility function, and the average level of consumption in the
economy. The effect of differences in the concavity of U is straightforward: the higher the concavity, the
larger the difference between wT and wM for a given entry cost EM . In other words, individuals with
higher risk aversion will be willing to "tolerate" a lower wage wT before migrating to manufactures.
Similarly, the higher the level of consumption in both sectors, the larger the difference between wT
and wM , which points to the potential effect of land rents (t) on the wage wT . In particular, everything
else constant, in an equilibrium with migration to manufacturing higher rents are associated with a lower
wage in the traditional sector wT . That is, in two otherwise identical economies in which employment
in the manufacturing sector is expanding (i.e. the migration condition (1) holds), strict concavity of
preferences implies that the wage in the traditional sector in the economy with higher per capita rents
(presumably an economy richer in natural resources) is lower. This is a somehow counter-intuitive result
that is key to understanding the mechanism played by real exchange rate undervaluations. The intuition
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is simple: the larger the rents or transfers t, the higher the level of consumption, and the lower the
marginal utility of consumption. A larger difference in wages is therefore necessary to generate the
same gap in utilities EM . In other words, the richer the individuals in terms of rents or transfers that
are not directly linked to their work, the lower the wage they will be willing to accept before deciding
to migrate. This result does not mean that the actual (observed) wage in the traditional sector (wT ) of
an economy richer in natural resources will necessarily be lower than in poorer ones. Instead, what the
result implies is that the width of the inaction zone is larger in this case, so that the wage that triggers
migration to manufacturing (wT , the minimum observable) is lower (and, therefore, less likely to be
observed in equilibrium).
2.3.2 Case 2: Inaction
Case 2 corresponds to situations in which the equilibrium level of employment in manufacturing, LM is
equal to the initial level, LM0. The equilibrium wage wT is strictly higher than wT but lower than wM ,
and therefore remains inside the inaction zone [wT , wM ].
In this case LM = LM0, and total employment in the T -sector remains unchanged LT = L−LM0. Em-
ployment in agriculture, LA, and the wage in the sector, wT , are determined by the first order conditions
of the firm in agriculture and the trade balance condition.
2.3.3 Case 3: Contraction of the Manufacturing Sector (de-industrialization)
Case 3 corresponds to a situation in which initial employment in manufacturing is higher than the level
consistent with the equilibrium (so thatwM is initially lower thanwT ). The achievement of equilibrium is
accompanied in this case by a process of de-industrialization in which workers migrate to the traditional
sectors. This scenario can occur if, for example, the productivity or the price in the agricultural sector in-
creases (or if the productivity or price in manufactures decreases), or if the productivity in nontradables
increases systematically less than in tradables (i.e. the Balassa-Samuelson effect).
The equilibrium wage in the traditional sector that is consistent with a partial de-industrialization
(i.e. 0 < LM = LM < LM0) is wT = wM (Case 3a). Given this wage, LA is determined by the first order
condition of the firm in agriculture and LM by the trade balance condition.
In the extreme case in which there is complete de-industrialization (i.e. LM = LM = 0), the economy
functions only with its traditional sectors (Case 3b), so that total employment is split between agriculture
and nontradables. The equilibrium wage wT (which is strictly higher than wM ) and employment in
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agriculture LA are simultaneously determined by the first order condition of the firm in agriculture and
the trade balance condition.
2.4 Comparative Statics
In this section I perform some comparative statics. I analyze changes in the entry cost, the assump-
tions regarding the distribution of land rents, the productivity of the manufacturing sector, and, most
importantly, the availability of land.
2.4.1 Reduction in Entry Costs
[Figure VI here]
The effect of a reduction in the entry cost EM is straightforward. It follows from equation (1) that, as
EM decreases, wT increases, so that the inaction zone narrows from below. Whether this change affects
the observed equilibrium depends on the initial equilibrium. For example, if wT is relatively close to wT
in the initial equilibrium, then the change in EM will probably make the migration condition (1) binding
and will induce migration to manufactures and an increase in wT 24 (Case A in Figure VI). If, on the other
hand, the initial wT is relatively distant from wT , it may occur that the reduction in EM does not effect
the observed equilibrium (Case B in Figure VI).
2.4.2 Changes in the Distribution of Rents
[Figure VII here]
The initial analysis assumed that land rents are equally distributed across the population. This section
analyses the effects of two alternative distributions of such rents, which are presented in Figure VII.
The first case assumes a more "progressive" distribution, that is, one that favors the workers in the
traditional sector. Incentives for migration to manufactures decrease, the wage that triggers migration,
wT , falls and the inaction zone widens. The opposite is true if a more "regressive" distribution of rents is
assumed, that is, one that favors relatively more the individuals in the manufacturing sector. In this case
wT increases, the inaction zone shrinks and workers in the traditional sector are more likely to migrate.
24The increase in wT implies that employment and production in agriculture falls, as well as land rents, which reinforce the
incentives for migration to manufactures. This is, however, a second order effect whose magnitude does not affect significa-
tively the results.
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In both cases, the magnitude of the effect on wT from changes in the distribution of rents depends the
amount on land, F 25.
2.4.3 Increase in Manufacturing Productivity
The effects of an increase in the productivity of the manufacturing sector, AM , are mixed. First, the most
direct consequence is an increase in wM provided that the pM remains unchanged. Second, following
this increment in wM , equation (1) implies that wT increases as well. The intuition of this change is
simple: an improvement in wM increases the value of migrating to manufactures, raising therefore the
wage that leaves individuals indifferent between staying in the T -sector and migrating (wT ). Moreover,
strict concavity of U implies that the change in wT is proportionally smaller than the increment in wM ,
implying that the absolute width of the inaction zone actually increases.
The third consequence of an increase in AM is related to the income effect that accompanies the
increase in wM . Specifically, an increase in wM will increase aggregate income and the domestic demand
for the three goods in the economy26 (as long as manufactures are produced in the economy, i.e. LM0 >
0). The response of the nontradable sector to a higher demand is to expand production by adding more
workers which, given the diminishing marginal product of labor in agriculture, is accompanied by an
increase in wT and, consequently, in pN . This implies an appreciationof the RER.
[Figure VIII here]
The final effects on the actual size of the productivity gap and onLM depend on the initial conditions.
If the initial share of labor in manufacturing (LM0) is relatively low and wT is close to wT (Case A in
Figure VIII), the increase in AM will make the migration condition (1) binding and, therefore, will be
associated with a increase of the productivity gap and an expansion of the manufacturing sector. This
prediction of the model is consistent with the evidence from China, where the increase in manufacturing
productivity that started in the early 1990s has been accompanied by, simultaneously, an increase in the
productivity gap and an expansion of employment and production in the manufacturing sector. On
the other hand, if LM0 is relatively high and wT is high (close to wM ), the income effect will probably
prevail, and the increase in AM will be followed by a contraction of manufacturing employment and an
expansion of nontradables (Case B in Figure VIII). Finally, in an intermediate case (with LM0 and wT
25The role of the distribution of rents is key in economies with high endowments of natural resources, as is the case of many
Latin American countries. If rents are sufficiently high, a redistribution that favors workers in the manufacturing sector can
actually eliminate the inaction zone.
26Assuming that the three goods are "normal" goods.
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at "intermediate" levels - Case C in Figure VIII), the increase in manufacturing productivity will have
no effect on manufacturing employment. The composition of aggregate production will be affected,
however, with manufacturing and nontradable production increasing (due to higher productivity and
employment, respectively), and agricultural production diminishing (due to lower employment in the
sector). In all cases there is a real appreciation of the RER.
2.4.4 Differences in Endowments of Natural Resources
[Figure IX here]
The modification of the endowment of land, F , has two main implications for the equilibria. First,
a higher endowment of land implies, everything else constant, that the productivity of workers in the
agricultural sector is higher, so that both, the equilibrium wage in the T -sector, wT , and the rents from
land, t, are higher as well. Aggregate income and demand are, therefore, higher also, which, as in the
previous case, implies a higher demand for nontradables, a further increase in wT , and a more appreci-
ated RER. Second, a higher F implies a wider inaction zone. This simply follows from the fact that, as
explained above, wT depends negatively on the level rents, t. Therefore, a higher endowment of land, F ,
implies, on the one hand, that the equilibrium wage, wT , is higher, and, on the other, that the wage that
triggers migration to manufactures, wT , is lower. Figure IX illustrates the equilibria of two (otherwise
equal) countries with different endowments of natural resources. The country richer in natural resources
(green) has a higher wT (and, therefore, a smaller wage gap between sectors) and a wider inaction zone.
The opposite is true for the country poorer in natural resources (red).
2.5 Costs and Gains from Labor Reallocation
As expected, the entry cost in the manufacturing sector potentially induces an inefficient allocation of la-
bor, which is reflected in the wage gap between sectors (i.e. wM−wT ) . Such wage differential represents,
at the same time, the potential gains in terms of production associated with the reallocation of workers
from the traditional to the manufacturing sector. These potential gains are, as it was seen above, greater
in economies with lower endowments of natural resources, which have a lower equilibrium wage in the
traditional sector, wT 27.
27The potential gains are even greater in economies with low F if measured relative to per capita income, provided that per
capita income is lower such economies
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But the reallocation of labor is also costly, provided that workers migrate voluntary to manufactures
only if the wage in the T -sector, wT , is at the bottom the inaction zone, wT . The difference between wT
and wT , therefore, provides an idea of the distortion that has to be introduced in order to incentivize
voluntary migration. In other words, in the same way that wM − wT represents the gains from labor
reallocation, the gapwT−wT , represents the costs of such reallocation, given that in order for the condition
wT = wT to hold, the initial misallocation has to be first exacerbated by either inducing a fall in wT , an
increase inwT , or both. These costs are, as explained above, higher in economies with lower endowments
of natural resources which, besides having a lower wT , have a higher wage that triggers migration, wT ,
due to lower rents.
[Figure X here]
Figure X illustrates the potential costs and gains of labor reallocation for the two countries of the
previous example (which differ in the endowment of land, F ). As it can be seen, a (policy-induced)
reallocation of labor from the traditional to the manufacturing sector is, in principle, more beneficial for
the economy with lower endowment of land (in red), which needs to introduce a less severe distortion
to get wT = wT and, at the same time, enjoy larger gains in labor productivity.
2.6 Room for Government Intervention
The previous analysis suggests that, under certain conditions, a policy aimed at reallocating labor from
the traditional to the manufacturing sector can potentially improve the allocation of labor and generate
growth. Additionally, it was shown that the equilibrium depends on the initial allocation of labor and,
in particular, on the share of employment in manufactures. This implies that a temporary government
intervention that effectively modifies the initial conditions has, potentially, a permanent positive effect on
the allocation of labor, moving the economy to a more efficient equilibrium with higher per capita in-
come. In the context of the static model analyzed here, a two-stage exercise can be designed: First, given
the initial distribution of labor, the government intervenes with the objective of inducing a reallocation
of labor to manufactures, so that the new level of employment in the sector is consistent with an equilib-
rium efficient from a point of view of production (i.e. one in which the wage in all sectors is equalized).
And, second, given the new allocation of labor the intervention ceases and the economy operates in a
standard way.
This section analyzes a set of possible interventions that might achieve the desired reallocation of
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labor. Despite the differences in instrumentation, the objective is, in all cases, to equalize the wage in
the traditional sector with the lower bound of the inaction zone, so that workers voluntary migrate to
manufactures.
2.6.1 Policies Aimed at Reducing Domestic Absorption
In the context of the model, any policy that reduces domestic absorption as measured in terms of tradable
goods should, in principle, induce a fall in the relative price of nontradables (i.e. a real depreciation)
and in the wage in the traditional sector. This type of outcome can be obtained, in the model, through
a contraction of aggregate demand (generated, for example, by the introduction of income taxes). In
practice, however, a real depreciation can be induced in many ways. One of the most common practices
consists in inducing a nominal depreciation (or devaluation) followed by a containment of the domestic
absorption as measured in domestic currency (which can require the use of sterilization and the increase of
domestic interest rates, and the imposition of measures that restrict of the expansion of domestic credit
and public expenditure). In this case, the real depreciation results from the fact that the nominal depreci-
ation increases the price of tradable goods (as measured in domestic currency) relatively more. Another
(more direct but less popular) alternative consists in inducing a contraction of the domestic demand as
measured in domestic currency (for which measures such as rising taxes, cutting public expenditure and
reducing domestic credit can help), which induces a real depreciation through a deflationary process
that affects, mainly, the nontradable sector. In both cases the policies might be complemented with the
imposition of controls on capital inflows.
An Example in the Model This section analyzes a particular example, in the context of the model,
of a policy aimed at reducing domestic absorption, inducing a real depreciation, and facilitating the
migration of workers from the traditional to the manufacturing sector. The example is by no means
exclusive.
First Stage (Government Intervention) Assume that, in the first stage, the government imposes an
ad-valorem income tax (so that the individuals’ available income is a fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) of its pre-tax
income) and lends abroad the tax revenue (at, for example, the international interest rate). In this way,
the government intervention effectively reduces the domestic demand and increases domestic savings.
If the original wage in the traditional sector is inside the inaction zone (that is, wT < wT < wM ),
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the contraction of domestic consumption induces a fall in the price of nontradables28, a fall in the wT ,
and a reallocation of labor from nontradables to agriculture. This initial depreciation has no effect on
manufacturing employment (and in fact has a negative effect in aggregate production). Only when wT
hits lower bound of the inaction zone, wT migration toward manufactures begins. As explained above,
this initial depreciation might be particularly large and costly in economies rich in natural resources,
but relatively small and less distortive in countries with scarce natural resources, where the initial wT is
closer to wT .
In addition to its effect on wT , depending on the concavity of preferences, the tax can have an effect
on wT . This can be seen in the migration condition (1) from which wT is determined, which now takes
the form:
U
(
γ
wM + t
p(wT )
)
− U
(
γ
wT + t
p(wT )
)
= EM (2)
With logarithmic preferences, for example, a proportional income tax (like the one analyzed here)
does not affect wT , so that once wT reaches wT , it remains at that level and the remaining adjustment
is made through reallocation of labor to manufactures. With preferences less concave than logarithmic,
the the wage that triggers migration, wT , also falls, so a larger depreciation is necessary before migration
begins. Finally, if U is more concave than the logarithmic function, the policy induces an increase in wT ,
so a smaller depreciation would trigger migration. In this particular case, if wT is initially sufficiently
close to wT , the government intervention might end up inducing migration to manufactures and an
appreciation of the RER.
In all cases, migration takes place until the new trade balance condition is satisfied, which implies a
positive trade balance equal to the amount of resources that the government transfers abroad.
When should the government cease intervening? Ideally, as mentioned above, the intervention
should cease when employment in manufactures reaches the level that is consistent with the efficient
equilibrium, which implies that wT = wM in the absence of intervention. (For the determination of such
optimal level of employment in manufactures it is necessary to have into account the net payments that
the country receives from the stock of international assets accumulated abroad.)
Second Stage (Final Equilibrium) Assume that, in the second stage, the government ceases inter-
vening and uniformly distributes (across individuals) the interest payments of the stock of international
28Assuming that the income elasticity of consumption is strictly positive.
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assets accumulated during the first stage29. Contrary to what occurs in the first stage, there are now three
main reasons for which an expansion of the domestic demand takes place: first, the elimination of the tax,
which increases individuals’ available income; second, the wage of the population that was originally in
the traditional sector (LT0) is now higher (and equal to wM ); and, third, the interest payments from the
international assets accumulated abroad are now distributed in population. In addition, the trade bal-
ance condition implies now a trade deficit equal to the payment of interests received. As a consequence,
the new and final equilibrium is characterized by a higher per capita income, a more appreciated RER
(remember that, now, wT = wM ), a larger nontradable and a smaller agricultural sector.
2.6.2 Policies Targeting Specific Sectors
The policy analyzed above is only one of many that could induce migration to manufactures and move
the economy to an equilibrium that is efficient from the point of view of production. This section briefly
discusses three of such interventions that target specific sectors of the economy.
Tax on Nontradables Consider an ad valorem tax, τN , on nontradable production. The net price re-
ceived by the firm in the sector is now pN (1 − τN ), and (using the the first order condition) the wage is
wT = pN (1− τN )AN .
The final effect of the tax on wT depends on the elasticity of demand for nontradables. If the demand
for nontradables is relatively inelastic, most of the tax is passed to consumers through an increase in pN ,
and there is no significant effect on wT and the allocation of labor. If, on the other hand, the demand for
nontradables is relatively elastic, most of the adjustment takes place through a fall in wT that induces,
first, migration from nontradables to agriculture and, once wT reaches wT , migration to manufactures.
The tax generates a real appreciation from the consumers’ point of view, but a real depreciation from the
producer’s perspective.
The main difficulty, in practice, of the use of this policy is related to its enforceability, given that in
most developing countries the nontradable sector is comprised by a large number of (small or even
single-person) firms that operate with high levels of informality.
Subsidy to Manufacturing Production Consider now an ad valorem subsidy, sM , to manufacturing
production. Per unit revenue of the firm in the sector is now pM (1 + sM ), and the wage is wM = pM A˜M ,
where A˜M ≡ (1 + sM )AM . It follows that, given that pM is determined in the international market, the
29This assumption regarding the distribution of the interests is for simplicity. Other distributions can be assumed WLOG.
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introduction of the subsidy has a similar effect on wM and wT as the increase in the productivityAM pre-
viously analyzed: it induces a proportional increase in wM and, consequently, a less-than-proportional
increase in wT that can, eventually, induce migration to manufactures. As in the previous case, the
subsidy induces a real depreciation from the producer’s perspective, but a real appreciation from the
consumers’ point of view.
There are several potential difficulties associated with the use of this type of policy. On the fiscal
side, for example, the policy requires either raising taxes or issuing debt, which is usually problematic.
Additionally, if the government issues foreign debt, there will be additional pressure for the appreciation
of the RER, which could end up offsetting the initial effect (one -possibly good- alternative is to finance
the subsidy with a tax on nontradables similar to the one analyzed above). Another potential problem
with the use of this policy in practice is that it gives place to (justified) anti-dumping complaints by
other countries. Finally, there might be problems when the policy has to be discontinued, given that the
elimination of the subsidy would imply a fall in the wage of the manufacturing sector.
Subsidy for Migrants A more "direct" approach would be to introduce a lump sum subsidy for work-
ers that migrate from the traditional to the manufacturing sector. The effects of this policy are, overall,
similar to the ones generated by the subsidy to manufacturing production analyzed above. The (relative)
advantage of this policy lies in that the subsidy would only apply to new workers in the manufacturing
sector (as opposed to all workers in the sector, as in the previous case), which implies a smaller fiscal
problem, less pressure for appreciation of the RER, less justified anti-dumping complaints, and avoids
the fall in wages once the policy is eliminated. There might be still problems related to the implementa-
tion, particularly if the number of migrants is large.
2.6.3 Summary of Main Predictions of the Model
Initial Conditions According to the model, the potential positive effects on both, manufacturing em-
ployment and real growth, of a policy that induces a real undervaluation depend on the joint verification
of the following initial conditions:
1. The existence of frictions in the labor market and, in particular, of entry costs in terms of utility for
workers that want to migrate to the manufacturing sector.
2. An initial distribution of labor with a relatively low share of workers in manufactures.
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3. Low endowments (relative to the population) of natural resources (agriculture in particular).
4. Low initial per capita income.
While conditions 1− 3 guarantee the existence of a productivity (and wage) gap of considerable size,
condition 4 (which may or may not be a consequence of the first ones) ensures that the productivity gain
of the induced labor reallocation is high relative to the initial per capita income.
Effects from Different Implementations of the Policy
1. Contraction of the domestic demand (a saving policy): the most probable effect is a real depreciation,
depending on how progressive the policy is. The trade and current account balance initially im-
prove. Once the policy ceases, inflow of payments from the accumulated stock of international
assets exacerbate the real appreciation.
2. Internal Redistribution of Resources (for example by subsidizing internal migration, taxing the non-
tradable or the traditional sector, and/or subsidizing manufactures): the real depreciation is mod-
erated (there can even be a real appreciation). The trade and current account balance are unaffected.
Asymmetric Effects of "Induced" Under- and Over-valuations Given the existence of an "inaction
zone" and the fact that the entry costs are (in principle) present only in the manufacturing sector, the
effects of an induced real overvaluation (caused, for example, by capital inflows) are not necessarily
symmetric with the effects of an induced real undervaluation discussed above.30
3 Empirical Analysis: Testing the Main Predictions of the Model
Two methods are used in this section to test empirically the main predictions of the model. The first
method (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) consists in performing cross-section regressions (for different periods and
samples) that show that the relationship between real undervaluation and both, GDP and manufacturing
30In the context of the model, if initially wT < wM , the first effect of a moderate overvaluation is to stop migration to
manufactures (in case there was any), to reduce production of agricultural goods, and to increase the production and prices
of nontradables. The wage gap between sectors shrinks. There is no growth if GDP is measured at constant initial prices, but
there is an increase of GDP if it is measured at current prices. Aggregate consumption increases and, everything else equal, the
trade and current account balances worsen.
If the overvaluation is more severe, so that wT equalizes wM , there is migration from manufactures to nontradables (de-
industrialization). This is more likely to occur in countries rich in natural resources, where the wage gap is initially smaller.
Eventually, a complete deindustrialization might take place, and a further increase in the wage, price, and production of
nontradables.
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growth, is stronger in countries with the proper "initial conditions". In order to do that, two key variables
are constructed: a measure of real undervaluation, and a "score" that summarizes the extent to which
a country had, based on the predictions of the model, the proper conditions for a policy-induced real
undervaluation. The second method (Section 3.3) consists in identifying the real undervaluations that are
induced by government interventions (in opposition to those that respond to changes in fundamentals),
and verifying that they are mostly observed in countries that, according to the model, have the best
conditions for that kind of policies.
3.1 Assessing the Relationship between Real Undervaluation, GDP Growth, and Manufac-
turing Production
This section begins by specifying the baseline cross-section regressions that assess the predicted rela-
tionship between real undervaluation, GDP growth, and manufacturing production.31 It describes the
construction of the measure of real undervaluation used in the analysis, and the "score", and finishes by
presenting and commenting the results.
3.1.1 Baseline Regressions and Data
The equations tested have the following form:
yitfin = α+X
′
itiniβ + γ1Uitavg + γ2S(Xitini)× Uitavg + εi
where yitfin is the observed outcome (dependent variable) for country i at time tfin (the end of the
period); Xitini are exogenous or predetermined regressors at time tini (the initial period); Uitavg is a mea-
sure of the average level of real undervaluation over the period; and S(Xitini) is a score that summarizes
the extent to which the regressors Xitini are in line with the conditions that, according to the model,
make a country a good candidate for an undervaluation. In particular, the score is defined such that
S(Xitini) = 0 means that country i at time tini is an "ideal" candidate, while S(Xitini) = 1 means that the
31It is worth mentioning that the results presented below are robust to different specifications with panel data, including
panel with country-specific fixed-effects, as well as Difference and System GMM. While the main problem with panel with
country fixed-effects is the endogeneity of the regressors due to the inclusion of lags of the dependent variable in the RHS of
the equation (e.g. lags of per capita income), the lack of good instruments is the main problem in the case of Difference or
System GMM. I deal with these issues by limiting the analysis to the use of cross-section regressions, in which all the included
regressors are either exogenous (such as endowments of natural resources) or predetermined in the initial period (e.g. initial
per capita income, size of the manufacturing sector, size of the traditional sector, etc.). The costs of restricting the analysis to
this type of regressions are at least two: first, the estimated standard errors might suffer from the fact that I have relatively few
countries in the sample, and, second, I do not make use of the within-country variation offered by the panel. Yet, I think is
worth to assume those costs in order to ensure the reliability of the results.
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country has none of the (theoretical) conditions for an undervaluation. It should be verified that γ1 > 0
and γ2 < 0, meaning that real undervaluation is positively associated with the outcome for countries
with low S (i.e. the good candidates), but that relationship weakens and may even become negative in
countries with higher S (i.e. the ones that do not have the conditions for a real depreciation).
3.1.2 Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in the first set of regressions is the average rate of growth of per capita in-
come (PPP in 2005$, from PWT 7.1) over the respective period. In the second set of regressions the
explained variable is the share of manufacturing in total tradable production (computed as value added
in manufacturing -category D, ISIC Rev.3- over the sum of value added in industry -categories C-E- and
agriculture, forestry and fishery -categories A-B, at current prices from UNSD).
3.1.3 A Measure of Real Undervaluation
Following Rodrik (2008), and as a way of accounting for changes in RER related to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect, the measure of undervaluation is computed as the residual of regressing the logarithm of the real
exchange rate on the logarithm of per capita income PPP.32 The residuals capture, in principle, deviations
of the RER from the level predicted by the country’s per capita income.33
Specifically, the regression has the following form:
ln(RERit) = α+ β ln(pcIncomeit) + It + εit
where i and t are country and year respectively, It are year fixed effects, and εit is an error term with
32The justification for controlling for per capita GDP is that, being a proxy for the relative level of productivity of tradables
to nontradables, it controls for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The question is how well per capita income proxies the relative
productivity of tradables. As a robustness check, an alternative measure of undervaluation is computed using, instead of per
capita income, the actual ratio of average productivities in tradables and nontradables sectors (which is computed using the
measures of sectoral labor productivities available in Timmer & de Vries (2009) and McMillan & Rodrik (2011) for the available
countries and years). The correlation between both measures of undervaluation is very high, at 0.89, for all the countries and
years for which both measures are available. In fact, the only countries for which the measure based on per capita income
underestimates the alternative measure of undervaluation are Nigeria and Venezuela, the only oil-exporter countries in the
sample.
33Pagan (1984) analyses various issues related to the use of residual generated regressors (as is the case of this measure of
undervaluation). He shows that in the model
y = δz∗ + γ (z − z∗) + e (3)
z = z∗ + η = Wα+ η (4)
where z∗ is the predicted or anticipated part of z and the term (z−z∗) represents the "unanticipated" part of z, "2SLS estimates
provide the correct values for δ and OLS estimates the correct ones for γ". Furthermore, if only "unanticipated" regressors are
included in equation (3) (i.e. δ = 0), then OLS produces the correct estimates of variance and efficient coefficient estimates.
This is precisely the case analyzed here.
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standard properties. Data for both the RER34 and per capita income PPP are from Penn World Table
Version 7.1. The original regressions are performed for the period 1970-2010 with all the countries in the
database, with the exception of Serbia and Georgia, which are notable outliers.
3.1.4 Measuring Initial Conditions
Initial income is proxied by the logarithm of per capita income (PPP in 2005 $) in the initial year of the
respective period.
The share of value added in the manufacturing sector (% of total value added, at current prices)
proxies the size of the manufacturing sector.35 The series corresponds to category D of ISIC Rev. 3, and
is from the U.N. Statistical Division, which contains annual sectoral value added for most countries from
1970 to 201036.
Two different proxies are used for entry costs: first, average years of schooling of the population
(from Barro & Lee (2010)) in the initial year of the respective period, which is intended to capture the
costs associated with the acquisition of the appropriate skills and human capital (in principle, individuals
with a lower level of education should face a higher entry cost if they move into manufacturing); and,
second, the country’s average index of ethnic, linguistic and religious homogenization (computed as 1−
fractionalization, from Alesina et al. (2003)), which is intended to capture the migration costs associated
with differences in these variables (implicitly, it is assumed that lower ethnic, linguistic or religious
homogenization imply higher costs for individuals that migrate into the industrial sector).
The size of the traditional sector is proxied by the percentage of rural population (from WDI) in the
initial year of the respective period, which, on the one hand, provides a rough idea of fraction of the
labor force that can be reallocated into the industrial sector and, on the other hand, is as an indicator of
the presence of entry costs.
Finally, per capita agricultural -arable and cultivable- land (from WDI, average of the period) and
per capita oil reserves (from CIA Factbook 2002/03, average of the period)37 are used as measures of the
34The RER is actually computed as RER = 1
p
, where p is "Price Level of GDP, G-K method (US = 100)" in PWT 7.1 (Heston
et al. (2012))
35Unfortunately the availability of data on manufacturing and industrial employment is limited. Timmer & de Vries (2009)
offer data for 28 countries for different periods (only 14 of them are currently developing countries). McMillan & Rodrik (2011)
complement the dataset with some African countries and China. Yet, when using these data, the number of observations in the
regressions was always less than 30.
36Value added in manufacturing (category D, ISIC Rev. 3) as a % of total value added is from UNSD for all countries except
for China, for which the data is obtained from WDI. The reason for this is that, for China in particular and for the period 1970-
2005, the UNSD only reports the value added of the industrial sector (categories C-E, ISIC Rev.3) instead of manufacturing
(category D).
37Per capita oil reserves in each year is estimated with total oil reserves in 2002/3 and each year’s population.
30
relative endowments of agricultural and mineral resources, respectively.
3.1.5 Computation of the Scores
The score that summarizes the extent to which a country satisfies the "initial conditions" that make it a
good candidate for a real undervaluation, is computed based on six indicator variables:
1. I(High Initial Income), which takes value 1 if per capita income of the country in the first year of
the period is higher than the sample median in the same year, and 0 otherwise.
2. I(High Schooling), which takes value 1 if the average years of schooling in the country in the first
year of the period is higher than the sample median in the same year, and 0 otherwise.
3. I(High Urban Pop.), which takes value 1 if the percentage of urban population in the country in
the first year of the period is higher than the sample median in the same year, and 0 otherwise.
4. I(High Agric. Land), which takes value 1 if the average per capita agricultural land of the period
in the country is higher than the sample median in the same period, and 0 otherwise.
5. I(High Homogenization), which takes value 1 if the average ethnic, linguistic, and religious ho-
mogenization in the country is higher than the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
6. I(Low % of Manufacturing in Tradables), which takes value 1 if the share of manufacturing
production in total tradable production in the country in the first year of the period is lower than
the sample median in the same year, and 0 otherwise.
The score used in the first set of regressions (the growth regressions) is the simple average of the first
five indicators (high initial income, high schooling, high urban population, high agricultural land, and
high homogenization). The score used in the second set of regressions (the ones that explain the share
of manufacturing in tradables) is the simple average of the last three indicators (high agricultural land,
high homogenization, and low initial share of manufacturing in tradables). A score equal to 0 implies
that the country has, from the model’s perspective, the conditions that maximize the potential positive
effects of undervaluation on GDP growth or on the share of manufacturing in tradables, respectively,
while a score equal to 1 implies the opposite.
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3.1.6 Periods and Samples
Two periods are analyzed: the period between 1970 and 2010, for which there are data on sectoral value
added from UNSD, and the sub-period between 1982 and 2003 which, by excluding the oil shocks of the
1970s and the more recent commodities boom, presents more stable commodities prices.
There are 180 countries for which the measure of undervaluation is available for all the years included
in these periods. For each country, the average of the measure of undervaluation in the respective period
is computed. In order to minimize the potential effect of extreme values of undervaluation, the countries
whose average of undervaluation is below the percentile 2.5 or above the percentile 97.5 are dropped.
Of the remaining 171 countries, only 116 have complete data for the first set of regressions for the period
1970-2010, and 118 for the period 1982-2003.
Additionally, a subset of developing countries from East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean,
and S.S. Africa is considered (these are all the countries in the dataset whose per capita income at the
beginning of the respective period was less than 50% that of the U.S. in the same year). There are 73
such countries with complete data for the first set of regressions for the period 1970-2010, and 72 for the
period 1982-2003.
3.2 Regressions
[Table III here]
Table III presents the results of regressing the average rate of growth of per capita income on the
measure of real undervaluation, a set of controls, and the interaction of undervaluation with some of the
controls. All the regressions in the table include the following set of controls: initial per capita income
(ln), per capita agricultural land (avg.), per capita oil reserves (avg.), initial years of education (ln), initial
urban population (%), the index of homogenization, and the initial share of manufactures in GDP (%).
Additionally, regressions (2) through (6) (panelsA&B) include the interactions between undervaluation
and some of the controls. Finally, regression (7) includes the interaction between undervaluation and the
score (whose computation is, as explained above, based on the controls).
Regressions (A1) and (B1) (Table III) show that the relationship between undervaluation and growth
for all countries is, on average, positive and significant at 5% when considering the entire period (A1),
but not significant for the period 1982-2003 (B1). This result is in line with the prediction of the model
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that the association between real undervaluation and growth is not necessarily positive for all countries
and periods, but only for those that satisfy certain conditions. The introduction of the interaction term
in regressions (A2) & (B2) shows how the association between undervaluation and growth depends on
the initial level of per capita income. The coefficients of undervaluation and of its interaction with initial
per capita income are, in both periods, significant at 1% or 5% respectively, and their signs imply that,
as expected, the relation between undervaluation and growth is positive for countries with low income,
but diminishes and eventually becomes negative as the initial per capita income of the countries increase
(the thresholds are around $11,500 and $5,200 -in 2005USD- for the periods 1970-2010 and 1982-2003
respectively). These results are in line with both, the predictions of the model, and the results presented
in Rodrik (2008).
Regressions (3 − 6) (panels A & B) in Table III include the interaction term between undervaluation
and the variables that, along with initial income, control for the "initial conditions" (namely, per capita
agricultural land, years of education, the index of homogenization, and urban population). It can be
seen, again, that the sign and significance of the coefficients are in line with the predictions of the model,
suggesting that the association between undervaluation and growth is stronger in economies with less
agricultural land, lower levels of education and urbanization, and more fractionalized populations (i.e.
lower homogenization). Interestingly, the significance of the coefficients of the interaction terms of re-
gressions 3−6 is higher in the period 1982-2003 (panelB). One possible reason for this is the fact that the
period 1970-2010 (panel A) includes the commodities boom of the 1970s and the more recent one of the
(late) 2000s. The improvement of the terms of trade that many countries rich in natural resources expe-
rienced during those episodes was followed, in most cases, by real appreciations and economic growth,
which weakens (and might even reverse) the relationship between real undervaluation and growth. An
important question is whether the interaction terms in regressions (3) to (6) (panelsA&B, Table III) pro-
vide indeed new information, or they simply reflect the fact that per capita agricultural land, education,
homogenization and urban population are correlated with initial income (in fact, the R2 of regression
(A2) is higher than that of regressions (A3), (A4) and (A6), and the R2 of regression (B2) is higher than
that of regressions (A3)-(A6), which suggests that the explanatory power of initial per capita income is
higher than that of any other individual variable -with the only exception of the index of homogeniza-
tion for the period 1970-2010). The answer to this question is given by regressions (A7) and (B7) (Table
III), which include the interaction between real undervaluation and the score. Despite the simplicity
with which the score is calculated, the coefficient of the interaction term is in both periods significant at
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1%. Furthermore, both regressions (A7 and B7) produce the highest R2 of their respective period, which
suggests that, as predicted by the model, the potential effect of real undervaluation on growth depends
on the joint verification of the initial conditions.
[Table IV here]
Table IV presents the results of replicating the previous analysis in a sub-sample of developing countries
in East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and S.S. Africa. Three regressions are presented
for each of the periods (1970-2010 and 1982-2003): the baseline regression (columns (1) and (4), respec-
tively); the regressions with the interactions between real undervaluation and the score (columns (3) and
(6)); and a third regression that includes the interaction with the individual initial condition that pro-
duces the highest R2 (columns (2) and (5), respectively), which should be, in principle, the variable with
highest "traction" in the score.
Despite the small size of the samples (73 and 72 observations respectively), the performance of the
score as a predictor of the potential effect of undervaluation remains strong. As expected, the explana-
tory power of initial per capita income (not reported in the table) diminishes among low income coun-
tries (the coefficient of the interaction of initial per capita income with the measure of undervaluation
is only significant at 10% for the period 1970-2010, and is not significant for 1982-2003). Instead, most
of the traction for the score is given in this case by the index of homogenization (columns (2) and (5) in
Table IV), implying that the association between real undervaluation and growth is particularly strong
in low-income countries with high degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization, which, as
mentioned above, could be associated with higher migration or entry costs for workers into manufac-
turing.
3.2.1 Real Undervaluation and the Composition of Tradable Production
Besides the relationship between real undervaluation and growth, the model has interesting predictions
regarding the composition of tradable production. In particular, the model predicts that in countries with
the appropriate initial conditions, a real undervaluation should lead to an increase in the production of
manufactures and a (relative) fall in the production of agricultural and other natural resources-based
goods. These predictions are tested in this section.
The regressions presented here are similar to the "growth" regressions analyzed in the previous sec-
tion. The difference is that the explained variable is, in this case, the share of manufacturing in total tradable
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production at the end of the analyzed period. There are at least three important reasons why this vari-
able is a good indicator of the degree of development of the manufacturing sector that can be used to
test the prediction mentioned above. First, there is no "right" number for this ratio, given that varies
between 0 and 1 depending on the productive structure and other particular conditions of the economy.
For example, the share of manufacturing in total tradable production will probably be lower in countries
with relatively high endowments of natural resources, whose production of tradable goods tends to be
dominated by commodities. Second, this ratio is not directly affected by changes in the real exchange
rate. This is so because changes in the price of nontradables (relative to the price of tradables) should
have, in principle, a proportional effect on both, the numerator (i.e. the value of manufacturing pro-
duction) and the denominator (i.e. the value of total tradable production), leaving therefore the ratio
unaffected38. Third, and final, the model predicts that a policy-induced depreciation of the RER should
have a positive, longer term, effect on this ratio only in economies with the proper initial conditions. In
such economies, the predicted increment in the production of manufactures and the relative fall in the
production of other tradable goods imply that the ratio increases (i.e. the numerator increases relative to
the denominator). This specific prediction is tested here.
[Table V here]
As mentioned above, the dependent variable in all the regressions in Table V is the final share of manu-
facturing in total tradable production. On the right hand side, the regressions include, in addition to the
measure of undervaluation, the following set of controls: initial per capita income (ln), per capita agri-
cultural land (avg.), per capita oil reserves (avg.), initial years of education (ln), initial urban population
(%), the average index of homogenization, and the level and square of the initial share of manufacturing
in total tradable production (%). Regressions (A1) and (B1) present the baseline regression (for 1970-2010
and 1982-2003, respectively) with no interaction term, and show that in both periods the association be-
tween real undervaluation and relative production of manufactures is positive but not significant. The
coefficients also have the expected sign in the regressions that include the interaction between real un-
dervaluation and each of the initial conditions ((A2) to (A5) and (B2) to (B5)), but they only become
significant in the period 1982-2003 and when interacting with initial years of schooling or with the in-
dex of homogenization, suggesting that the positive association between real undervaluation and the
38This is different in the case of the ratio of manufacturing production to GDP, given that a real depreciation (i.e. a fall in the
price of nontradables) mechanically deflates the value of GDP or inflates the value of manufactures, and therefore increases the
ratio.
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relative expansion of manufactures in total tradable production is particularly strong in countries with
initially low levels of education and/or highly fractionalized populations.
Finally, regressions (A6) and (B6) include the interaction between real undervaluation and the score,
which is computed as the simple average of four indicator variables: I(High Income), I(High Agric.
Land), I(High Schooling) and I(High Homogenization) in the first period of the respective period. The
coefficients are significant at 5%, and the R2’s reach their maxima in both periods, proving, again, that
(in line with the predictions of the model) the association between undervaluation and manufacturing
development is better assessed when considering a set of initial conditions simultaneously. The results
are confirmed when the analysis is performed only with the sub-sample of developing countries, whose
results are reported in Table VI.
[Table VI here]
3.3 Identification of Real Undervaluations Induced by Government Interventions
One of the most critical issues in almost every analysis that involves the use of the real exchange rate is
the fact that, being an endogenous variable, it is difficult of determine whether the observed variations
respond to truly "exogenous" government interventions, or simply represent "endogenous" responses
to changes in "fundamentals" (such as changes in sectoral productivities or in the terms of trade). The
traditional approach to addressing this issue consists in computing deviations of the RER from what is
defined as the “equilibrium real exchange rate”39, which depends critically on the adopted definition
of RER equilibrium and on the availability of data that allows for the computation of measures that are
comparable across countries40.
A different approach is used here in order to determine the origin of the observed movements in the
RER, which consists in analyzing the co-movement of the (relative) size of the tradable sector with the
RER. Specifically, the ratio of tradable production to GDP can be expressed as:
39As explained in IMF (2006) -the 2006 report on the revised and extended methodologies for exchange rate assessments
used by the IMF’s Consultative Group on Exchange Rate Issues-, there are at least three complementary but different method-
ologies for the computation of the "equilibrium" RER: the “macroeconomic balance” approach, a reduced form “equilibrium
real exchange rate” approach, and an “external sustainability” approach.
40In addition to the lack of data on many of the variables that could, in principle, be important determinants the equilibrium
RER, there are also problems with the comparability of country-specific indices across countries (the typical examples are RER
and Terms of Trade indices).
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TP_GDP =
pTT
pTT + pNNT
=
T
T + pNpT NT
(5)
where pT and T are the price and production indices of tradable goods, and pN and NT the price and
production of nontradables, respectively. According to the model, an endogenous real depreciation (that
is, a fall in the relative price pNpT induced by changes in the parameters of the model) takes place if:
1. The productivity of the tradable sector decreases, in which case the production of tradables, T ,
decreases;
2. The productivity of the nontradable sector increases, in which case the production of nontradables,
NT , increases;
3. The terms of trade decrease (in particular, a fall in the price of exports), in which case the value of
total tradable production, pTT , falls relative to GDP.
In all these cases, the real depreciation is accompanied by a fall in the ratio of tradable production to
GDP.
The opposite is also true: either an increase in the productivity of tradables, a fall in the productivity
of nontradables, or an improvement in the terms of trade induce, simultaneously, an endogenous real
appreciation and an increase in the share of tradables in GDP.
On the other hand, it follows from expression (5) that an exogenous real depreciation (that is, a fall in
pN
pT
that is not caused by changes in sectoral productivities or in the price of exports) is accompanied by
a fall in the term pNpT NT relative to T and, therefore, by an increase in the ratio of tradable production to
GDP. Again, the opposite is also true: an exogenous real appreciation is accompanied by a fall in the ratio
of tradable production to GDP.
[Figure XI here]
The four possible cases are summarized in Figure XI. This particular relationship between the causes
behind the movements in the RER and the relative size of the tradable sector (predicted by virtually any
model with tradable and nontradable goods) provides a simple tool for the identification of real under-
and over-valuations that respond to "exogenous" government interventions, which only requires the
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computation of the share of tradable production on GDP (which is perfectly comparable across countries)
and has a very intuitive and informative graphic representation.
3.3.1 A Measure of Relative Size of Tradable Production in GDP
The measure of relative size of the tradable sector is computed in two stages. The first stage is the
computation of the ratio of tradable production to GDP, which is calculated as the sum of the value
added (at current prices, as % of GDP) in Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (categories A-B,
ISIC Rev. 3), and Industry (categories C-E -ISIC Rev. 3- which includes Mining, Manufacturing, and
Utilities)41. This ratio displays a strong negative correlation with per capita income (see Appendix A),
which complicates its comparison across countries. In order to account for the differences in the ratio
related to the differences in income levels, the ratio is regressed (in a second stage) on the logarithm
of per capita income and a set of year fixed effects42. The residuals from this regression constitute the
measure of relative size of the tradable sector, and captures the deviations of the ratio of the tradable
production to GDP from what the level of per capita GDP predicts. The details about the construction of
this variable are presented in Appendix A.
3.3.2 Identification of "Exogenous" Undervaluations
[Figure XII here]
Figure XII presents scatter plots of the measures of oversize of the tradable sector and undervaluation
for the periods 1970/79, 1980/89, 1990/99, and 2000/10. The sample includes all the developing coun-
tries43 with population larger than 1 million in East Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, and
S.S. Africa. In each period, countries are represented by points whose coordinates are the average of the
measure of undervaluation (horizontal) and the average of the measure of relative size of tradable sector
(vertical), in the respective period. As explained above (figure XI), the co-movement of those variables
provides information on the extent to which the degree of real undervaluation (or overvaluation) experi-
enced by each country in a particular period is "endogenous" (i.e. responds to changes in fundamentals)
or "exogenous" (i.e. are policy-induced).
41Notice that even though utilities (water, power, gas, etc.) are by definition tradables, in practice they are nontradables in most
of the cases. As a robustness check (and in order to verify the potential impact that the inclusion of utilities might have on
the measure of tradable production), sectoral data from Timmer & de Vries (2009) and McMillan & Rodrik (2011) is used. It is
verified that utilities represent, on average, only 2% of GDP, with small variations across countries.
42The two-step computation is similar to the computation of the measure of real undervaluation.
43A country is defined as developing country in a particular year if its per capita income (PPP USD2005) is lower than 50% that
of the U.S. in the same year.
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It can be seen from the figure that there is significant dispersion in terms of both, undervaluation and
relative size of the tradable sector. The period between 1980 and 1989 exhibits the lowest dispersion in
terms of relative size of the tradable sector, and the largest dispersion of undervaluation. During those
years, while some countries in S.S. Africa (in particular Tanzania, in the SW quadrant) and East Asia
(Cambodia, Mongolia) experienced large real appreciations, other countries in South Asia (Afghanistan,
in the NE quadrant) and Latin America (mainly Central American and Caribbean countries, but also
Mexico and, for some years Brazil, Peru and Venezuela) experienced significant real depreciations. The
years between 2000 and 2010, on the other hand, exhibit the lowest dispersion in real undervaluation
and, in coincidence with the boom in commodity prices, the largest dispersion of relative size of the
tradable sector (being Angola and Rep. of Congo -in the NW quadrant- the countries with the most
(relatively) oversized tradable sectors and large overvaluations, and Eritrea -in the SE quadrant- the country
with the most undersized tradable sector and a large endogenous undervaluation).
Figure XII allows also to analyze the patterns the different regions have followed over time. A com-
mon feature of most countries in the two Asian regions is that their tradable sectors remain relatively
oversized during the four periods (the main exceptions are Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1970s and
Mongolia in the 1980s). This pattern was combined during the first 20 years (1970-1989) with high dis-
persion in terms of undervaluation: while Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia
remained relatively undervalued for several years, other countries including China were actually over-
valued. Beginning in the 1990s, however, most Asian countries moved to positions of relative underval-
uation. In fact, with the exception of Korea, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea that for some years in
the 1990s experienced slight "endogenous" overvaluations, all the East Asian countries were positioned
in the NE quadrant between 1990 and 2010, experiencing "exogenous" (or policy-induced)real underval-
uations. As it was seen in Section 1, many of these Asian countries have the conditions that, according
to the model, make them good candidates for the use policy-induced real depreciations. Interestingly,
with the exception of Afghanistan and India for a few years, the South Asian countries remain in SE
quadrant for most of the period between 1990 and 2010, which suggests that the real undervaluations
experienced by them are, at least in part, endogenous responses to the conditions of the fundamentals in
those economies44.
44This implies that the reasons behind South Asia’s undervaluations may be related, for example, to low levels of productivity
in the production of tradables -as documented in Figure III in the case of India-, and the fact that the recent commodity boom
represents for them a fall in their terms of trade. This would also explain why the relationship between undervaluation and
growth in this region is weaker than in East Asia (Figure I).
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An important observation can be made regarding the African region. The figure shows that between
1970 and 2000 most of the S.S. African countries were relatively overvalued (and, in many cases, "ex-
ogenously" overvalued -SW quadrant). It is only in the last decade that several of these economies shift
to positions of real undervaluation closer to zero or positive. Compared to other regions, however, the
region remains, on average, relatively overvalued. These findings are in line with the evidence on the
role of foreign aid on the appreciation of the real exchange rate in Africa presented, for example, by van
Wijnbergen (1985) and Rajan & Subramanian (2011).
Finally, the countries in Latin America and Caribbean display large dispersion in terms of under-
valuation, and do not show a consistent pattern over the four periods. The tradable sector (relative to
GDP) remained relatively undersized during the 1990s and part of the 2000s, a period characterized by
low commodities prices. This trend was reverted in several countries of the region (Venezuela, Chile,
Argentina and Bolivia among others) in the early 2000s, following the increase in commodities prices,
which moved Venezuela and Chile (two of the most important commodities producers of the region) to
a position of endogenous appreciation (NW quadrant).
4 Conclusions
In this paper I ask whether it is true that a “competitive real exchange rate” is behind China’s success,
something that the media and many policy makers sustain but that is not supported by the most promi-
nent economic models. I develop a model that uses insights from the “unlimited supply of labor” and
“de-industrialization” literatures (Lewis (1954), Corden & Neary (1982)) to gain a better understanding
of these issues. I perform an extensive empirical analysis with the purpose of understanding the key
underlying conditions that make China and other Asian economies suitable for policies aimed at depre-
ciating the real exchange rate. I then compare the case of Asia with those of Latin America and South
Saharan Africa. I propose a 3-sector model with labor market frictions that explains how a policy that
depreciates the real exchange rate (by, for example, fostering domestic savings) can, at the same time,
generate real growth through a reallocation of workers from a low-productivity traditional economy
into a high-productivity manufacturing sector. The policy is particularly effective in countries with ini-
tially low industrial development, relative abundance of labor and scarcity of agricultural resources, and
high barriers for the entry of workers into the manufacturing sector. This is, precisely, the case of many
Asian economies. I verify empirically that the association between real undervaluation and growth, and
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real undervaluation and development of the manufacturing sector is stronger in countries with these
conditions. Finally, I propose an empirical strategy for the identification of real depreciations induced
by government interventions, and verify that such episodes have been mainly observed in the last two
decades in the East Asian economies.
An extremely simplified model was presented here with the purpose of explaining the proposed
mechanism and highlighting the role played by each of its key elements. Future research should explore
the quantitative implications of the model in a dynamic setting, introducing capital accumulation and
endogenous sources of growth associated with the expansion of the industrial sector. Interesting impli-
cations regarding the timing of the transition and the pattern of structural transformation and income
distribution can result from variations in the instrumentation of policies aimed a depreciating the RER
or the way frictions are modeled.
Despite its simplicity, the theoretical framework developed here contributes to better understand the
mechanics of a real undervaluation, its potential effects on the labor market and, more generally, its link
with real growth. The theory helps to understand the role played by the recently documented sectoral
productivity gaps (Bosworth & Collins (2008), McMillan & Rodrik (2011), Gollin et al. (2011), and de Vries
et al. (2012)), and provides an explanation for its puzzling persistence in some developing countries. In
the same line, the model provides an explanation for the different patterns of sectoral reallocation of
labor observed in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as recently documented by McMillan & Rodrik (2011)
and de de Vries et al. (2012).
Before closing, two important comments on some of the limitations of the empirical analysis are in
order. First, as is the case with most studies that use cross sectional data, the analysis does not imply
causality but simply verifies the existence of the proposed empirical regularities. And second and most
importantly, the endogeneity of the decision regarding the use of the RER as a policy instrument raises a
clear "identification" issue that plagues this entire empirical literature. Addressing this issue is one of the
greatest challenges of the literature. In spite of this, the results presented here provide useful information
for understanding how the association between undervaluation and both, growth and the composition
of tradable production, depends on the initial conditions.
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A A Measure of Relative Size of the Tradable Sector
[Figure XIII here]
Figure XIII presents a scatter plot of the share of tradable production in GDP and per capita income
for the periods 1970-2010. As it can be seen from the figure, there is a strong negative relationship
between both variables.
Explaining the reasons behind that negative relation would require digging into the literature on
structural transformation, and is not the matter of this work (that might be explained, for example, by
the non-homotheticity of preferences). What I do, instead, is to take this negative relationship as a fact,
and construct a measure that informs about how much countries deviate from that particular trend at
each moment in time. This measure of relative size of the tradable sector is estimated with a two-stage
procedure, similar to the one used for the estimation of measure of real undervaluation. First, I regress
the share of tradables in GDP on the logarithm of per capita income and a set of year fixed effects; and,
second, I compute the residuals from that regression, which constitute the measure of relative size of the
tradable sector. Specifically, the regression has the following form:
Trad_GDPit = α+ β ln(pcIncomeit) + It + εit
where the subindices i and t refer to country and year respectively, It are year fixed-effects, and εit is a
standard error term. I run the regression for the period 1970-2010 and exclude Serbia and Georgia. The
estimated coefficient of (ln) per capita income is −6.5, with a t-statistic (based on robust standard errors)
higher than 49. Since per capita income is in logarithmic scale, one way of interpreting of the result is
that, in average, the share of tradable production in total GDP falls by 4.5 percentage points when per
capita income doubles. The distribution of the residuals of the regression (i.e. the measure of relative size
of the tradable sector) is displayed in Figure XIV. It can be seen that the distribution is centered at zero
and, with the exception of a few cases above 30%, most of the observations lie in the range [−30%, 30%].
[Figure XIV here]
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Table I: Regional Economic Indicators, 1970-2010
pc GDP PPP pc GDP
growth
Underva-
luation
Gross Savings Manufacturing Production
2000US$ % Ln % GDP % GDP % Tradables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
China
1970-74 385 4.8 -0.88 28.8 35.3 48.9
2006-10 6,006 10.0 0.23 51.6 32.6 63.1
1970-2010 2,010 7.6 -0.07 38.6 34.6 55.1
India
1970-74 894 -0.2 -0.03 16.2 14.5 24.4
2006-10 3,047 6.7 0.54 31.9 15.4 40.7
1970-2010 1,588 3.3 0.35 22.5 15.9 32.5
Rest of East & South Asia
1970-74 1,392 4.1 0.14 15.2 14.8 27.0
2006-10 5,188 3.8 0.26 22.1 21.9 48.0
1970-2010 3,097 3.2 0.21 20.5 19.0 39.0
Latin America & Caribbean
1970-74 5,445 5.0 0.23 20.0 23.6 55.7
2006-10 8,739 2.6 -0.10 20.5 16.6 52.2
1970-2010 6,948 1.6 0.11 20.2 20.7 55.6
South Saharan Africa
1970-74 1,435 2.6 -0.26 14.8 11.3 22.7
2006-10 1,643 3.1 -0.06 10.5 8.0 17.7
1970-2010 1,389 0.5 -0.22 11.0 10.4 21.2
Note: Population-weighted means by region-year of countries with pc GDP PPP (2000USD) <10,000 in 1970. Number of countries: Asia
31, LAC 30, SSA 46. Data on savings is missing for some country-years, Nigeria is missing in SSA, and Taiwan in Asia. Manufacturing
Production/Tradable production is the ratio of Manufacturing/GDP and Total Tradable production/GDP, which is estimated as Indus-
trial Production/GDP+ Agricultural Production/GDP. Source: pc GDP is from PWT 7.1. Undervaluation is estimated using data from
PWT 7.1. Gross Savings are from WDI. Manuf. Prod./GDP, Industrial Prod./GDP and Agr.Prod./GDP are from UNSD complemented
with WDI.
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Table II: Regional Demographic and Natural Resources Indicators, 1990-2010
Natural Resources Rents pc Agric. pc Oil Rural Years of
1990-2010 Land Reserves Pop. Education
USD2005 % GDP ha 1990 bbl 2002 % 1990 1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
China 53.3 4.1 0.114 20.9 73.6 4.9
India 22.7 3.4 0.202 4.1 74.5 3.0
Rest of East & South Asia 64.0 5.8 0.170 14.3 68.1 4.2
Latin America & C. 309.8 6.2 0.343 182.0 29.4 5.2
S. S. Africa 109.8 14.3 0.347 58.1 71.7 3.2
Population-weighted means by region-year of countries with pc GDP PPP (2000USD) < 10,000 in 1970. Pc Agr. Land is total cultivable
and arable land divided by population. Pc Oil Reserves is total oil reserves in 2002/03 (earliest year available) divided by population.
Pc Natural Resources Rents USD2005 is approximated by multiplying Total Nat. Res. Rents/GDP (current prices) by pc GDP at constant
prices in 2005 USD. Education is average years of schooling of the population above 25 years. Source: Oil reserves are from CIA Factbook.
Education is from Barro-Lee. The rest is from WDI.
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Table III: Real Undervaluation and Per Capita Income Growth Rate
Cross-Section Regressions
A - 1970-2010
pc Inc. Growth (Avg.) (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7)
Undervaluation (Avg.) 0.355** 2.976** 0.688** 0.710** 1.728*** 0.916** 1.038***
(0.171) (1.135) (0.278) (0.305) (0.594) (0.366) (0.333)
Interactions Underval, x:
Initial pc Income (Ln) -0.318**
(0.128)
pc Agric. Land (Avg.) -1.285*
(0.771)
Initial Yrs. School. (Ln) -0.360*
(0.203)
Homogenization (Index) -2.565**
(1.039)
Initial Urban Pop. (%) -0.014*
(0.007)
Initial Score -1.342***
[and additional controls] (0.459)
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
R-squared 0.403 0.430 0.415 0.422 0.435 0.419 0.440
B - 1982-2003
pc Inc. Growth (Avg.) (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7)
Undervaluation (Avg.) 0.024 2.519** 0.357** 0.638* 1.160** 0.596* 0.601**
(0.120) (0.999) (0.171) (0.383) (0.482) (0.325) (0.240)
Interactions Underval, x:
Initial pc Income (Ln) -0.294***
(0.109)
pc Agric.l Land (Avg.) -1.317**
(0.504)
Initial Yrs. School. (Ln) -0.434**
(0.208)
Homogenization (Index) -2.059***
(0.754)
Initial Urban Pop. (%) -0.013**
(0.005)
Initial Score -1.097***
[and additional controls] (0.305)
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118 118
R-squared 0.292 0.352 0.320 0.337 0.344 0.322 0.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 5% of the observations were excluded (the 2.5% with the highest
and the 2.5% with the lowest values of undervaluation) to minimize the effect of extreme values. Controls: All regressions include the
following set of controls: per capita income (ln, initial year), per capita agricultural land (period average), per capita oil reserves (period
average), years of education (ln, initial year), urban population (%, initial year), index of homogenization, share of manufactures in GDP
(%, current prices, initial year). Score: Simple ave- rage of 5 indicator variables: I(high income), I(high schooling), I(high Agric. land),
I(high Homogenization) and I(high Urban Pop.), which take value 1 if the respective variable is above the sample median in the initial
year, and 0 otherwise.
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Table IV: Real Underval. and Per Capita Income Growth Rate - Dev. Countries
Cross-Section Regressions - Developing Countries in Four Main Regions∗
1970-2010 1982-2003
pc Inc. Growth (Avg.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Undervaluation (avg.) 0.542** 2.863*** 1.127*** 0.238 1.397** 0.623**
(0.239) (0.889) (0.408) (0.192) (0.678) (0.266)
Interactions Underval. x:
Index Homogenization -4.876*** -2.413*
(1.791) (1.297)
Initial Score -1.875** -1.344***
(0.857) (0.490)
[and additional controls]
Observations 73 73 73 72 72 72
R-squared 0.473 0.530 0.507 0.357 0.399 0.405
(*) Countries in East Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia, and S.S. Africa with per capita income lower than 50% that of the
U.S. in the initial year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 5% of the observations were excluded (the
2.5% with the highest and the 2.5% with the lowest values of undervaluation) to minimize the effect of extreme values. Controls: All
regressions include the following set of controls: per capita income (ln, initial year), per capita agricultural land (period average), per
capita oil reserves (period average), years of education (ln, initial year), urban population (%, initial year), index of homogenization,
share of manufactures in GDP (%, current prices, initial year). Score: Simple ave- rage of 5 indicator variables: I(high income), I(high
schooling), I(high Agric. land), I(high Homogenization) and I(high Urban Pop.), which take value 1 if the respective variable is above
the sample median in the initial year, and 0 otherwise.
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Table V: Real Undervaluation and Manufacturing Production
Dep. Variable: Share of Manufacturing in Total Tradable Production
A - 1970-2010
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Undervaluation (Avg.) 0.076 0.268 0.077 0.081 0.214 0.161**
(0.056) (0.350) (0.080) (0.056) (0.135) (0.076)
Interactions Undervaluation x:
Initial pc Income (Ln) -0.024
(0.045)
pc Agricultural Land (Avg.) -0.004
(0.212)
Initial Yrs. Schooling (Ln) -0.006
(0.056)
Homogenization (Index) -0.263
(0.260)
Initial Score -0.180
[and additional controls] (0.132)
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115
R-squared 0.684 0.685 0.684 0.684 0.686 0.688
B - 1982-2003
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6)
Undervaluation (avg. of the period) 0.025 0.293 0.105 0.128* 0.269** 0.156**
(0.041) (0.198) (0.075) (0.068) (0.109) (0.060)
Interactions Undervaluation x:
Initial pc Income (Ln) -0.032
(0.024)
pc Agricultural Land (Avg.) -0.311
(0.240)
Initial Yrs. Schooling (Ln) -0.074
(0.046)
Homogenization (Index) -0.443**
(0.202)
Initial Score -0.250***
[and additional controls] (0.094)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.765 0.768 0.771 0.770 0.773 0.776
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 5% of the observations were excluded (the 2.5% with the highest
and the 2.5% with the lowest values of undervaluation) to minimize the effect of extreme values. Controls: All regressions include the
following set of controls: per capita income (ln, initial year), per capita agricultural land (period average), per capita oil reserves (period
average), years of education (ln, initial year), urban population (%, initial year), index of homogenization, share of manuf. in tradable
prod. (level & square, initial year). Score: Simple average of 5 indicator variables: I(high income), I(high schooling), I(high Agric. land),
I(high Homogenization) and I(high Urban Pop.), which take value 1 if the respective variable is above the sample median in the initial
year, and 0 otherwise.
52
Table VI: Real Undervaluation and Manufacturing Production - Dev. Countries∗
Dep. Variable: Share of Manufacturing in Total Tradable Production
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6)
Undervaluation (Avg.) 0.111 -0.115 0.194 0.111 0.414** 0.205**
(0.071) (0.559) (0.138) (0.074) (0.191) (0.092)
Interactions Undervaluation x:
Initial pc Income (Ln) 0.031
(0.078)
pc Agricultural Land (Avg.) -0.297
(0.372)
Initial Yrs. Schooling (Ln) -0.000
(0.071)
Homogenization (Index) -0.641
(0.409)
Initial Score -0.290
[and additional controls] (0.175)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.589 0.589 0.591 0.589 0.601 0.600
B - 1982-2003
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6)
Undervaluation (Avg.) 0.077 0.034 0.205 0.107 0.360** 0.194***
(0.062) (0.384) (0.131) (0.075) (0.143) (0.065)
Interactions Undervaluation x:
Initial pc Income (Ln) 0.006
(0.055)
pc Agricultural Land (Avg.) -0.540
(0.421)
Initial Yrs. Schooling (Ln) -0.032
(0.070)
Homogenization (Index) -0.591*
(0.306)
Initial Score -0.380***
[and additional controls] (0.134)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.646 0.646 0.656 0.647 0.661 0.669
(*) Countries in East Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia, and S.S. Africa with per capita income lower than 50% that of the
U.S. in the initial year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 5% of the observations were excluded (the
2.5% with the highest and the 2.5% with the lowest values of undervaluation) to minimize the effect of extreme values. Controls: All
regressions include the following set of controls: per capita income (ln, initial year), per capita agricultural land (period average), per
capita oil reserves (period average), years of education (ln, initial year), urban population (%, initial year), index of homogenization,
share of manuf. in tradable prod. (level & square, initial year). Score: Simple average of 3 indicator variables: I(high schooling), I(high
Agric. land), and I(high Homogenization, which take) value 1 if the respective variable is above the sample median in the initial year,
and 0 otherwise.
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Figure I: Undervaluation and per capita GDP Growth
Selected Economies
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Figure II: Undervaluation and Employment in Manufactures
Selected Economies
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Figure III: Relative Labor Productivity: Manufactures/Agriculture
Selected Economies
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Figure IV: Labor Productivity: Manufactures and Agriculture
Selected Economies
57
Figure V: Model - Equilibrium (3 Cases)
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Figure VI: Model - Effects of a Reduction of Entry Costs
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Figure VII: Model - Effects of a Change in the Distribution of Rents
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Figure VIII: Model - Effects of an Increase in Manufacturing Productivity
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Figure IX: Model - Effects of Differences in Endowments of Natural Resources
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Figure X: Model - Diff. in Endowments of Nat. Res. - Gains & Costs
Potential Gains & Costs of Labor Reallocation
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Figure XI: Real Undervaluation & Relative Size of Tradable Sector
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Figure XII: Undervaluation & Oversize of Tradable Sector
Four Main Regions - Developing Countries
Note: Only countries with population larger than 1 Million and per capita GDP (PPP) lower than 50% that of the U.S. through
each period are considered.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from PWT 7.1 and UNSD.
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Figure XIII: Tradable Production (% GDP) & Pc Income
1970-2010
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Figure XIV: Estimated Relative Size of Tradable Sector (% GDP)
Histogram
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